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I. JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2(a)-3(2)(f).

II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court in and
for Utah County, State of Utah wherein appellant entered a guilty plea to
the charge of manslaughter.

After sentencing, the defendant made a

motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.

A hearing was held before the

Honorable Boyd L. Park and the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was
denied.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1)

Whether the trial court followed the procedures prescribed

by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. 11.
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2)
knowingly

Whether the defendant's plea of guilty was in fact entered
and

with

a

full

knowledge

and

understanding

of

its

that

the

consequences and of the rights he was waiving.
3)

Whether

the trial

court

properly

concluded

appellant had knowingly and understanding^ entered his plea of guilty.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE

1.

U. C. A. 77-35-11 (e) (4).

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant

Frank

Gene

Powell

homicide, murder in the second degree.

was

charged

with

criminal

Ultimately, the appellant entered

a plea of guilty to an amended information charging criminal homicide,
manslaughter.

The appellant received an indeterminate sentence of one to
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fifteen (1 to 15) years in the Utah State Prison.
sought to withdraw his plea of guilty.

By motion, the appellant

A hearing was held before the

Honorable Boyd L. Park and the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was
denied.

VI. RELEVANT FACTS

On November 30, 1987, a warrant of arrest was authorized by
Judge Joseph Dimick charging the appellant with criminal homicide murder
in the second degree.
On December 4, 1987, the appellant appeared with his attorney
before Judge Lynn W. Davis for arraignment.
A preliminary hearing was held in this matter on February 23,
1988, before Judge Lynn W. Davis.
attorney.

The defendant was present with his

The court heard and considered the evidence of the state and

entered its order binding the defendant over the Fourth Judicial District
Court for arraignment.

Arraignment occurred before Judge Boyd L. Park
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on March 4, 1988.

The defendant again appeared with counsel.

He

entered a not guilty plea and trial was set for May 23, 1988.
The appellant next appeared before Judge Boyd L. Park on May
20, 1988, at which time he asked leave to withdraw his not guilty plea and
expressed his intention to enter a guilty plea to an amended information to
be filed by the state wherein he would be charged with criminal homicide,
manslaughter.

The court granted the appellant's request, the state filed its

amended information

and, pursuant to plea negotiations, the appellant

entered his guilty plea to the charge of manslaughter.

Present with the

appellant at the time he changed his plea was his attorney, Bradley P. Rich.
On July 22, 1988, the appellant appeared before the court, with
counsel, for sentencing and received an indeterminate sentence of one to
fifteen (1 to 15) years in the Utah State Prison.
By motion date September 28, 1989, the appellant sought to
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that his plea was not made
knowingly and with full understanding of the various constitutional rights
he would be waiving with the entry of such a plea.
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The matter was heard before Judge Boyd L. Park, and after
hearing the evidence, having reviewed the court file, together with
transcripts, the court denied the appellant's motion to withdraw the guilty
plea.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
court to make certain findings before accepting a plea of guilty.

The court

has the duty of ascertaining that the defendant is entering his guilty plea
with full knowledge and understanding of the rights he is waiving.

In this

case, the trial court relied on the representations of defense counsel and
the affidavit of the defendant, instead of conducting its own independent
inquiry to make sure the appellant had a full understanding of what his
guilty plea connotated and its consequences as required by State v.
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).

-5-

VIII. ARGUMENT

The appellant seeks to withdraw his plea of guilty for the reason
that he did not fully understand the effect of his plea and the various
constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving.
It is clear from a reading of the transcript of the appellants
guilty plea and the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, that he was
unable to read the English language above a second grade level and did not
attempt to read the affidavit submitted to the Court in connection with his
guilty plea.
At the hearing in connection with his plea of guilty, the following
relevant discussion took place:
Mr. Rich:

"He has gone through the 9th grade . . .

as a

practical matter he reads at a second or third
grade level because of that I have been over him
every paragraph of this and [sic] feels that he
understands it.

He does not feel

comfortable

reading such a document, but I have read it to
him." [T-4]
-6-

The Court:

"You have been over this statement with your
attorney in some detail and you understand that
you are waiving certain constitutional rights when
you plead guilty."

Defendant:

"Yes."

The Court:

"Those

constitutional

rights

have

been

fully

explained to you by Mr. Rich?"
Defendant:

H^V~~

The Court:

"You have initialed each of those appropriate

"Yes

«

paragraphs?"
Defendant:

"TT^,,

The Court:

"And you are willing at this time to acknowledge

"Yes

»t

that those paragraphs are true and accurate?"
Defendant:

""\7"^« •»

"Yes

The Court then received the following

statement from

the

Deputy County Attorney of the factual basis for the charge:
Ms. Ragan:

"Yes Your Honor on this date November 29, 1987,
the defendant and the victim were both at a party
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along with a number of other persons.

During the

course of the night the defendant and the victim
both were there and there was some drinking
going on and some conflict

between the two

individuals, some fighting, verbal fighting and that
sort of thing.

They went out to the parking lot at

one point and the defendant entered his vehicle.
The victim was standing in the parking lot.

He

circles the parking lot and came around

and

struck

the

victim.

The

medical

examiner

determined that the cause of death was that blow
from the truck."
The Court:

"Have you heard a statement of the facts as
recited by the County Attorney Mr. Powell, is that
a true and accurate statement?"

Defendant:

"Yes."

The Court:

"If it is your intent to plead guilty you may sign
that statement."
(WHEREUPON, the defendant signs the statement.)
-8-

After a statement by the Court on the acceptability of the plea
bargain, the Court made the following finding prior to accepting the guilty
plea from the defendant to manslaughter.
The Court:

"Yes thank you.

The record may show that the

court has received a statement of the defendant
before pleading guilty.

That he has appropriately

initialed each of the paragraphs.

This statement

has been signed by those parties required to sign
the same. The court will affix its signature.
The court has further received an affidavit of
counsel signed by Mr. Rich in this matter.

The

court will order those documents to be made a
part of the file.
The above statement by the court, along with the affidavit of the
defendant are the sum total of the record relevant to compliance with Rule
11 (e) of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.
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Rule 11 (e) (Utah Code Ann. §77-35-11 (e) (1987)) in relevant
part, provides:
The Court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . and shall
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings:

(1)

That the plea is voluntarily made;

(2)

That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by
entering the plea he waives all those rights;

(3)

That the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;

(4)

That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed
upon him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences; and

(5)

Whether the tender plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so,
what agreement has been reached

-10-

"Rule 11 (e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11 (e) requirements are complied
with when a guilty plea is entered."
(Utah 1987).

State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312

In G i b b o n s , the Utah Supreme Court clarified the law

concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts in Utah and
established a strict Rule 11 (e) compliance test in the acceptance of guilty
pleas.

Id.. Under Gibbons, trial courts may no longer rely on defense

counsel's advice or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements
of Rule 11 (e) but rather, "with or without an affidavit or defense counsel's
advice, the trial court must conduct on-the-record review with defendant
of the Rule 11 (e) requirements."

State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Gibbons requires the trial court to conduct its own independent,
formal inquiry to "make sure that the defendant has a full understanding
of what the plea connotes and of its consequences."
1312.
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Gibbons. 740 P.2d at

The Gibbons court noted:
"Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements for
taking a guilty plea by using a written affidavit. However,
the affidavits are not uniform throughout Utah, and trial
judges often rely on defense attorneys to inform their clients
of the contents of the affidavit . . . because of the importance
of compliance with Rule 11 (e), . . . the law places the burden
of establishing compliance with those requirements on the
trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand
the contents of the affidavit." I& at 1313.
In State v. Valencia. 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
the Utah Court of Appeals observed the following:
"When an affidavit is used to evidence defendant's
knowledge and willingness to plead guilty, the trial
court's examination of defendant regarding the
affidavit's contents should be sufficiently detailed and
extensive to proved a factual basis to conclude from
defendant's responses that his decision was knowing
and voluntary. His understanding of the elements of the
charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may
not be presumed from a silent ox incomplete
examination. (Citations omitted). Id., at 44.
In G i b b o n s , the Utah Supreme Court did not suggest that a
written affidavit or plea form be used in every case.

But, if such an

affidavit or form is signed by the accused and used as part of the guilty
plea to evidence his or her understanding of the charged offense and the

-12-

waiver of certain rights, that statement cannot serve as a mere substitute
for the full and complete examination on the record by the trial court that
is required by the rule. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312-14.
"The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency,
but an affidavit should be only the starting point, not
an end point in the pleading process . . . the trial judge
should then review the affidavit with the defendant,
question the defendant concerning his understanding of
it and fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-35-11
on the record before accepting the guilty plea."
id- at 1313-14.
The Court also observed that:
"The procedure may take additional time, but
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of
judicial economy." Id.- at 1314.
In State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92 (1988), this court, after an
analysis of the state of the law in Utah regarding the duty of the trial court
in accepting guilty pleas, made the following observation:
" . . . trial courts may not rely on defense counsel
or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements
of Rule 11 (e). Rather, with or without an affidavit or
defense counsels advice, the trial court must conduct
an on-the-record review with the defendant of the
Rule 11 (e) requirements. Id., at 94
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This court, in Vasilacopulos. noted that the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (1987) had, in effect:
" . . . replaced the prior record as a whole test with
a strict Rule 11 (e) compliance test in accepting a
defendant's guilty plea." Id. at 94
It is appellants position that the strict compliance

test is the

present standard of review and is, therefore, applicable in this case.
However, it is appellant's contention that the record in this case does not
rise to the standard required by either test.
The record of the inquiry by the trial court of the defendant as
required by Rule 11 (e) shows the following deficiencies:
(1)
defendant

There was no dialogue about or finding made that the

knew

he

was

waiving

his

rights

against

compulsory

self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against him, as required by Rule 11 (e) (3).
(2)

There was no inquiry by the court as to what the nature

and elements of the offense to which the defendant was pleading guilty
and as to whether or not the defendant understood those elements.
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There was not statement or finding by the trial court that
the defendant knew and understood that at trial the State would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
There was no discussion of or finding that the defendant knew a plea of
guilty was an admission of all those elements.

All of the above is required

by Rule 11 (e) (4).
(3)
defendant

There

was

no discussion

about

or finding

that

the

knew the maximum and minimum sentence that could be

imposed, as required by Rule 11 (e) (5).
(4)

There was no finding that the plea was voluntarily made,

as required by Rule 11 (e) (2).
An examination of the record of the defendant's plea shows that
there is a complete lack of compliance by the trial court with the
requirement of Rule 11 (e).

It is clear from the record that the trial court

relied on the defendant's attorney's explanation of the affidavit, in spite of
the fact that the defendant could not and had not read the affidavit.
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The lower court in ruling on the motion did not apply the strict
compliance test, but erroneously applied the "record as a whole test."

(See

finding 6 of the courts decision.)
A review under the "record as a whole test", compels the same
conclusion as the defendant urges above.
In Jolivet v. Cook. 115 Ut. Adv. Rep. 17 (1989), the Supreme
Court, in a case upholding a lower courts finding by 'clear and convincing
evidence1, that Jolivet had knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty
plea, said:
" . . . the absence of a finding under [Rule 11] is
not critical so long as the record as a whole affirmatively
establishes that the defendant entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its consequences and
of the rights he was waiving." Id., at 18. (emphasis added)
The only factual support for the courts ruling is that the defendant's
attorney had gone over the affidavit with the defendant and his attorney
felt that the defendant understood the contents of the affidavit.

There was

no findings by the trial court, nor any basis established for the findings
required by Rule 11 (e), even after an examination of the "record as a
whole."
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In his decision denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his
plea, the court basically weighed the testimony of the appellant that he did
not understand the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty against the
testimony of the defendants attorney that he had read the defendant the
affidavit and he felt the defendant understood the consequences of his
plea.

(See decision.)

Such a comparison is irrelevant.

The focus must be

on the defendant's understanding at the time the plea was entered as
shown by the findings of the court.

IX. CONCLUSION

Based on the authorities presented, appellant seeks an order of
this court directing that his plea of guilty be withdrawn and have the same
remanded to the court for trial.
DATED this 2£

day of June, 1990.

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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